Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1998

State of Utah v. Ellie Watson : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
James H. Beadles; Assistant Attorney General; Jan Graham; Utah Attorney General; Vincent
Meister; Deputy Salt Lake District Attorney; Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee.
David C. Cundick; Parker, Freestone & Angerhofer; Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Watson, No. 981538 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1998).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1783

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

i* i Mti COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF
IN THE UTAH COURTWM^PPEALS

State of Utah,

•\>Q

DOCKET NO.

Plaintiff/Appellee,

fr/P?-

-

Priority No. 2 (not incarcerated)

Ellie Watson,
Case No. 981538-CA
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

DEFENDANT APPEALS FROM AN ORDER OF RESTITUTION AFTER
A CONVICTION FOR ATTEMPTED OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE, IN
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE TYRONE E. MEDLEY,
PRESIDING
JAMES H. BEADLES (5250)
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor
P.O. Box 140857
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857
(801)366-0353
DAVID C. CUNDICK
Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

VINCENT MEISTER
Deputy Salt Lake District Attorney
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

FILED
Utah C t W of Appeal

FILED
APR 1 3 1999
COURT OF APPEALS

MA|J\I 3 1999
JuMfcD'Atitandro
Clonk of thoOoust

IN THE U T A H C O U R T OF APPEALS

State of Utah,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Priority No. 2 (not incarcerated)
v.
Ellie Watson,
Case No. 981538-CA
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

DEFENDANT APPEALS FROM AN ORDER OF RESTITUTION AFTER
A CONVICTION FOR ATTEMPTED OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE, IN
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE TYRONE E. MEDLEY,
PRESIDING
JAMES H. BEADLES (5250)
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor
P.O. Box 140857
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857
(801) 366-0353
DAVID C. CUNDICK
Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

VINCENT MEISTER
Deputy Salt Lake District Attorney
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856 (Utah 1995)

2

State v. Depaoli, 835 P.2d 162 (Utah 1992)

5

State v. McBride, 940 p.2d 539 (Utah App. 1998)

5

State v. Sigman, 919 P.2d 45 (Or. 1996)

5, 6

State v. Voetberg, 781 P.2d 387 (Or. 1989)

6

State v. Boswell, 628 P.2d 763 (Or. 1981)

6

Statutes
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (Supp. 1998)

1

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 1998)

passim

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (1995)

6

-ii-

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

i

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND BASIS OF JURISDICTION

1

ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

1

RELEVANT PROVISIONS

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

4

ARGUMENT

5

BECAUSE DEFENDANT'S ADMISSIONS WERE UNRELATED TO
THE DAMAGES FOR WHICH SHE WAS ORDERED TO PAY
RESTITUTION, THE ORDER WAS IMPROPER AND SHOULD BE
VACATED
CONCLUSION

5
6

ADDENDA
Addendum A

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (1995)

Addendum B

Order of Restitution

IN THE UTAH COURT

PPEALS

Stall' "•'?" ' t.ili,

Plaintiff/Appellee,
Priority No. 2 (not incarcerated)
v.
Ellie Watson,
Case.

981538-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND BASIS OF JURISDICTION

Defendant pled guilty to attempted obstruction of justice as part of a plea
agreement (R. 41-47) After imposition of sentence, i.e., probation, the court, convened a
iestituimn heating and consequently

MHIITHI

defendant to pay restitution for ahomicide

that occurred on July 24,1996 (R. 77-78). That order of restitution was entered on
August 14, 1998; defendant filed a timely appeal thirteen days later (R. 79.) Defendant
appeals only the order of restitution. This Court has original appellate jurisdiction
pursuaui to Ulan i ode

,AIIII J I"K

.la

HV in Mipp

1098).

ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

Since defendant was not convicted of any criminal conduct relating to the cause of
death of Lonnie Durazo, were defendant's admissions sufficient to make her liable for
restitution arising froni "lb: death

IIIMII"' "' \\A\\ «

YHi; Aim. >L; 7 M 2Gl(8)(a)(Supp. 1998)?

Whether defendant's statements constituted admissions for purposes of that statute is a
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question of law and this Court grants no deference to the trial court's conclusion. State v.
Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 859 (Utah 1995). The State confesses error here because the
defendant did not admit to any criminal conduct that caused the homicide of Lonnie
Durazo.
RELEVANT PROVISIONS

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 1998) is reproduced in Addendum A and cited
throughout the text.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The State initially charged defendant with criminal homicide murder, resulting
from Mr. Durazo's death, and attempted criminal homicide murder, for injuries inflicted
upon Melissa Fraga (R. 10). She was charged with several other individuals for the same
offenses (Id.). Eventually, defendant pled guilty to attempted obstruction of justice (R.
41). In her plea agreement certificate, she admitted only that she "attempted to dispose of
physical evidence in a criminal case by allowing it to be sold to another person, to wit: a
car" (R. 42).
At her sentencing hearing, defendant made the following statement, but carefully
did not admit to any criminal conduct regarding the homicide.
Basically, I just want to say that I know I have been caught in the
middle of a situation which I guess I have inappropriately acted. I feel
really bad about it. It has caused me a lot of emotional stress and it is all I
guess my fault. I realize, you know, the importance of leading a straight
life. I feel really bad. I want to apologize to the victim's family.
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(Tr. Sentencing Hearing, Case No. 971015103, Feb. 2,1998 at 6. Defendant made
similar statements to the PSI investigator and the caseworker at the Utah State Prison
during her diagnostic evaluation. In the PSI, the following information appears:
DEFENDANT'S VERSION OF OFFENSE:
"A homcide [sic] occurred. Which at the time I was unaware
of. One year later. I sold my car when I learned it was
involved in a crime. I am very sorry for what happened. I am
sick thinking about the potential punishment for the crime. I
have grown and learnedfromthis experience and Im [sic]
ready to move forward with my new lifestyle."

Comments: During the presentence interview Ms. Watson stated that from
the information she has 'pieced together,' a girlfriend, Melissa Parker,
asked her to give the people a ride, but she did not know the people. She
said she 'must have' driven the people to a house, the people must have
gotten out of the car, committed the crime, came back and got in the car and
they left. She did not know a crime had been committed and can not [sic]
recalled [sic] the specific day or what happened other than she was with
Mellisa. Ms. Watson stated that she is not guilty of what she pled to and
thinks could be acquitted if she took it to trial; however, she was 'greedy'
and wanted to be out ofjail, so she took the plea bargain.
Presentence Investigation Report at 2.
During her diagnostic evaluation, defendant made an additional statement, though
similar in nature to the one given to the PSI interviewer.
Defendant's Version (update): Ms. Watson made the following additional
statement.
I met this girl at a party on July 4,1996. I used to go to
parties to get to know people in the music and rap industry. I
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wanted to be a main singer and not a backup singer. I sing R
and B and was going to start out singing for rap artists. I met
Melissa. I had barely gotten my car the month before and
hadn't been out much. She and I were some of the only white
girls there. We went to this party a couple weeks later. We
didn't like it so we went to Main Street on the 23rd (day before
Pioneer Day parade) where everyone was camping out. We
were with all kinds of girls I had never met before. One of
her girlfriends got lost in the crowd. We thought she might
find her way back to the party. She was there. These guys
were drunk and said they needed a ride. I didn't know where
they lived so I just followed directions. It was dark and I
didn't know the area. They said to pull over and they were
going to get out. They asked me to wait a minute. I was in a
hurry and said ok but hurry up. I heard gunshots far away and
wasn't sure that's what they were or if it was firecrackers.
They came running back to my car and said let's go. I
thought they might have been shot at because they were
running. I never asked what happened. I was nervous
because they were running. This was none of my business. I
took my girlfriend home and dropped them off somewhere.
I'm not sure where it was
Diagnostic Evaluation Report at 2.
At the restitution hearing, the trial court ordered defendant to reimburse the Utah
Crime Victims' Reparations Fund monies paid to the victim's family. This order was for
joint and several liability with the co-defendants (R. 77-78).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(8)(a) allows a court to order restitution only if the
defendant has been convicted of a crime that resulted in pecuniary damages, agrees to pay
restitution, or admits to the criminal conduct. Defendant did not admit to the homicide,
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i.e., the criminal conduct for which the restitution was ordered. Consequently, the
restitution order lacks the requisite factual basis.
ARGUMENT

BECAUSE DEFENDANT'S ADMISSIONS WERE UNRELATED TO
THE DAMAGES FOR WHICH SHE WAS ORDERED TO PAY
RESTITUTION, 1 HE ORDER WAS IMPROPER AND SHOULD BE
VACATED.
Defendant admitted driving a group of people to what turned out to be a gang
shooting. She admitted and pled guilty to attempted obstruction of justice for selling the
car she used to make that drive. However, none of these statement admit to the criminal
conduct that resulted in the victim's death. It therefore does not fall within the definition
of restitution that state law allows to be awarded. Subsection 76-3-20 l(8)(a) states that
"[f]or the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense shall include any
criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court...."
Though Utah's appellate courts have never before analyzed this portion of the
restitution statute, Oregon's appellate courts have done so. Those cases are helpful
because Utah's restitution statute is modeled after Oregon's. State v. Depaoli, 835 P.2d
162, 163-64 (Utah 1992); State v. McBride, 940 P.2d 539, 542 (Utah App. 1998). In
State v. Sigman, 919 P.2d 45, 483 (Or. 1996), the Oregon Court of Appeals was called
upon to determine the propriety of a restitution order when the defendant had not been
convicted of the conduct and had not admitted to it. It stated:
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The evidence must show that the pecuniary damage that is the
subject of a restitution order was caused by an offense of
which the defendant was convicted or to which he or she
admitted having committed
A person may not be ordered
to pay restitution for a crime for which he neither was
convicted nor admitted committing.
Sigman, at 484-85. Similar is State v. Voetberg, 781 P.2d 387 (Or. 1989) where the court
of appeals reversed an order of restitution because, not only did the defendant not admit
personal liability, but adamantly denied it. Under Oregon law too, a defendant's actual
responsibility for criminal conduct must be established with some formality.
For the purposes of determining the basis for restitution, the
admission of a defendant is essentially the same as a plea of
guilty that would support a conviction
Because such an
admission can result in liability for substantial sums of
money, defendant's responsibility for the criminal activities
ought to be firmly established.
State v. Boswell 628 P.2d 763, 768 (Richardson, P.J., concurring) (Or. 1981).
CONCLUSION

Because defendant did not admit to criminal conduct leading to the death of the
victim, the trial court's order of restitution is incorrect and should be vacated. This
reversal should not result in any other change to defendant's conviction or sentence as she
has not otherwise challenged them. This Court should exercise its power under Utah
Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5) to modify defendant's sentence as necessary.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS $_ April 1999.
JAN GRAHAM
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
TAMES H. BEADLES

Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM

A

76-3-201.

Sentences or combination of sentences allowed — Civil penalties —
Restitution — Hearing — Definitions.

(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Conviction" includes a:
(i) judgment of guilt; and
(ii) plea of guilty.
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or
any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the
sentencing court with or without an admission of committing the criminal conduct.
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general damages,
which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the
facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the money
equivalent of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses
including earnings and medical expenses.
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to
a victim, including the accrual of interestfromthe time of sentencing, insured damages,
and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or transportation and as
further defined in Subsection (4)(c).
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has suffered
pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities.
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's criminal
activities.
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a person
convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or combination of them:
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law;
(d) to imprisonment;
(e) to life imprisonment;
(f) on or after April 27,1992, to life in prison without parole; or
(g) to death.
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law to:
(i) forfeit property;
(ii) dissolve a corporation;
(iii) suspend or cancel a license;
(iv) permit removal of a person from office;
(v) cite for contempt; or
(vi) impose any other civil penalty.
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(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence.
(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order
that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided in this subsection, or
for conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea
agreement. For purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as defined in
Subsection (l)(e).
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the
criteria and procedures as provided in Subsections (4)(c) and (4)(d).
(iii) If the court finds the defendant owes restitution, the clerk of the court shall
enter an order of complete restitution as defined in Subsection (8)(b) on the civil
judgment docket and provide notice of the order to the parties.
(iv) The order is considered a legal judgment enforceable under the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, and the person in whose favor the restitution order is entered may seek
enforcement of the restitution order in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
In addition, the Department of Corrections may, on behalf of the person in whose favor
the restitution order is entered, enforce the restitution order as judgment creditor under the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(v) If the defendant fails to obey a court order for payment of restitution and the
victim or department elects to pursue collection of the order by civil process, the victim
shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees.
(vi) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when recorded in a
judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is subject to the same rules as a
judgment for money in a civil action. Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from
the time of sentencing.
(vii) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting the restitution
payments to be credited to principal first and the remainder of payments credited to
interest in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
(b) (i) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, Chapter 30,
Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is convicted of criminal activity in
the county to which he has been returned, the court may, in addition to any other sentence
it may impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended by any
governmental entity for the extradition.
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall consider the
criteria in Subsection (4)(c).
(c) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete restitution and
court-ordered restitution.
(i) Complete restitution means the restitution necessary to compensate a victim for
all losses caused by the defendant.
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(ii) Court-ordered restitution means the restitution the court having criminal
jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the criminal sentence at the time of
sentencing.
(iii) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be determined as
provided in Subsection (8).
(d) (i) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under
this subsection, the court shall make the reasons for the decision a part of the court record.
(ii) In any civil action brought by a victim to enforce the judgment, the defendant
shall be entitled to offset any amounts that have been paid as part of court-ordered
restitution to the victim.
(iii) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when recorded in a
judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is subject to the same rules as a
judgment for money in a civil action. Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from
the time of sentencing.
(iv) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting the restitution
payments to be credited to principal first and the remainder of payments credited to
interest in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the
restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow the defendant a full hearing on
the issue.
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence tf e court may impose, the court shall
order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses if the
defendant was:
(i) transported pursuant to court orderfromone county to another within the state
at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal charges;
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and
(iii) convicted of a crime.
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental
transportation expenses if any of the following apply:
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent failure to appear
a warrant is issued for an infraction; or
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order.
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection
(5)(a)(i) shall be calculated according to the following schedule:
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported;
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; and
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported.
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(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to each
defendant transported regardless of the number of defendants actually transported in a
single trip.
(6) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that one of
three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order imposition of the term
of middle severity unless there are circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the
crime.
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a statement
identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or presenting additional facts. If
the statement is in writing, it shall be filed with the court and served on the opposing
party at least four days prior to the time set for sentencing.
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify imposition of the
highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in the case, the probation
officer's report, other reports, including reports received under Section 76-3-404,
statements in aggravation or mitigation submitted by the prosecution or the defendant,
and any further evidence introduced at the sentencing hearing.
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and reasons for
imposing the upper or lower term.
(e) The court in determining a just sentence shall consider sentencing guidelines
regarding aggravation and mitigation promulgated by the Commission on Criminal and
Juvenile Justice.
(7) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnaping, rape of a
child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse of a child, the
defendant causes substantial bodily injury to the child, and if the charge is set forth in the
information or indictment and admitted by the defendant, or found true by a judge or jury
at trial, the defendant shall be sentenced to the highest minimum term in state prison.
This subsection takes precedence over any conflicting provision of law.
(8) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense
shall include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court
or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A victim of an offense, that
involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or a pattern of criminal activity, includes
any person directly harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the
scheme, conspiracy, or pattern.
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete restitution,
the court shall consider all relevant facts, including:
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage to or loss or
destruction of property of a victim of the offense;
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and devices
relating to physical, psychiatric, and psychological care, including nonmedical care and
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treatment rendered in accordance with a method of healing recognized by the law of the
place of treatment; the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and
rehabilitation; and the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the offense
resulted in bodily injury to a victim; and
(iii) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense resulted in the
death of a victim.
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered
restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsection (8)(b) and:
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment of
restitution will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant;
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or on
other conditions to be fixed by the court;
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution and the
method of payment; and
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitution
inappropriate.
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may defer entering an order of
restitution if the court determines that the complication and prolongation of the
sentencing process, as a result of considering an order of restitution under this subsection,
substantially outweighs the need to provide restitution to the victim.
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David C. Cundick, #4817
PARKER, FREESTONE & ANGERHOFER, PC
50 West 300 South, #900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801)328-5600
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

ORDER OF
RESTITUTION
Plaintiff,

-vs-

Case No. 971015103
ELLIE WATSON,

:
Judge Medley
Defendant.

On the 22nd day of June, 1998, the Court heard arguments on the defendant's opposition to
payment of restitution. The defendant was represented by her attorney, David C. Cundick. The
State of Utah was represented by Carlos Esqueda. The Court, having considered the arguments of
counsel and for good cause appearing, now enters the following
ORDER
1.

Defendant Ellie Watson is hereby ordered to pay restitution in such amount as have

been made of the Victim's Reparation's Fund relating to the death of Lonnie Durazo.

1

2.

Adult Probation and Parole is to contact the Victim's Reparation's Fund and report

to the Court the amount of restitution owed and to contact the defendant to arrange for monthly
payments of such amount.
DATED this

fj

day of August, 1998.
'COURT

svjjlj

The Honorable Tyrone E. Medley,
Thkd/DIstrict Court Judge

v

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
Vincent Meister,
Attorney for State of Utah

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the-3th- day ofJafy, 1998,1 caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following parties at the addresses indicated.
Vincent Meister, Esq.
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

2

